Although Iran’s military factories were targeted, the flow of weapons bound for the Iran-backed Houthi rebels has continued, and increasingly passes through smuggling routes in the Horn of Africa, as demonstrated by the frequent cargo seizures, according to an analysis published by the Italian the institute for International Political studies (ISPI).
Eleonora Ardemagni, ISPI Senior Associate Research Fellow Middle East and North Africa, found that “For the Houthis, smuggling is both an economic and a strategic tool. On the one hand, it boosts external revenues that are used to finance the war. On the other, profit-driven networks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden shape alliances able to transcend sectarian divides”.
Ardemagni added :
Cooperation between the Houthis and Al Shabaab (al-Qaeda’s Somali affiliate) “has intensified” – according to UN experts – and now involves “weapons smuggling, technical training” including “operational tactics, and exchange of logistical support”.
In parallel, the Houthis and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have shown “increased collaboration”, including smuggling and training for AQAP operatives in Yemen.
In the medium to long-term, Houthi-driven technical and knowledge transfer to armed and terrorist groups in the broader Red Sea region can result into further maritime security risks.
According to the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen’s final report, in 2025, the Houthis are the “main suppliers and in control of smuggling activities” with Al Shabaab and AQAP.
Against this backdrop, counter-smuggling is now central to the Yemeni internationally recognized government’s strategy, as well as those of regional and international allies.
There are two reasons for this. First, curbing Houthi smuggling networks can meaningfully reduce the group’s revenues and degrade its offensive capabilities.
Second, counter-smuggling is one of the very few issues on which opposing factions in the Yemeni government and the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) agree.
Weapons (and fuel) are not the only items being smuggled. According to the UN, the Houthis “have been amassing substantial illegal resources” through the organized smuggling of drugs since 2024, with a “rising trend in the smuggling and trafficking of narcotic drugs within Yemen”. This is growing rapidly, as the UN was still only “investigating” reports on the topic as recently as 2023.
In 2025, the Omani land route appears to still be a “primary” conduit for arms smuggling, despite growing checks by Omani authorities and pressure from allies. UN experts reported that the Shahn and Sarfayt land border crossings, between Oman and Yemen, “are regularly used to bring in items intended for military use”.
Maritime routes are now varied, involving the Arabian Sea and increasingly, in recent times, the Red Sea. Alongside the direct route from Bandar Abbas (Iran) to Al Salif port (close to Hodeida), two other pathways to Yemen, both through the Horn of Africa, are thought to be the most used by smugglers tied to the Al Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The first is the route from Somalia’s waters to the Houthi-controlled Red Sea coast or, according to the 2025 UN final report, to Hadhramaut and Shabwa on the Arabian Sea. UN experts state Somalia is “increasingly” used as a “transit hub” for weapons destined for the Houthis, with “several smuggling routes running through Somalia to Yemeni ports”.
The second route goes from Djibouti, hidden under commercial cover, to Al Salif and Hodeida, as tacitly emerges also from the 2025 UN final report.
Ardemagni concluded: “At present, counter-smuggling is one of the few areas of political common ground for Yemen’s competing forces. Translating this thematic convergence into concrete policies could help strengthen and – possibly even – broaden political cohesion.
On this goal, European states, the GCC and the US are on the same page. Further cooperative options should also be explored to maximize outcomes, building on current collaborative efforts to support the Coast Guard.